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OMINOUS PARALLELS AND OPTIMISTIC DIFFERENCES: 
OPIUM IN CHINA AND AFGHANISTAN 
James Windle1 
 
Abstract 
This paper compares two of history‟s largest producers of opium - Afghanistan (2000-
11) and China (1917-35) - to suggest that in both cases production was facilitated by: 
(1) A lack of central control over the national territory; (2) The existence of local 
power-holders; (3) Internal violent conflict; (4) The existence of a significant domestic 
opium consuming population.  
 
The initial analysis is extended by introducing a successful opium production 
suppression intervention, The People‟s Republic of China (1950s/1960s), to suggest 
that the control of opium in contemporary Afghanistan requires the Government to: 
(1) Extend the state into isolated and hostile areas; (2) Facilitate a sense of self-
interest in the Afghan Government and political elite towards opium suppression; (3) 
Facilitate a perception that suppression benefits opium farmers; (4) Strengthen the 
capacity to monitor opium farmers and enforce the law.  
 
Keywords: Afghanistan; Alternative development; China; Drug law enforcement; 
Opium;  
 
Introduction 
The Afghan and Chinese opium trades have been well documented, however, no 
study has yet to compare the two countries at the peak of their respective production 
(1917-35 for China and 2000-11 for Afghanistan). While there are inherent difficulties 
in transferring experiences across time and space, there are extensive and insightful 
similarities between the experiences of history‟s two largest opium producing 
countries. Furthermore, during the 1950s China, under the Communist Government, 
was able to remove all unregulated opium production from its national territory. 
Introducing Communist China provides an additional element to the comparative mix. 
This article shall provide in-depth narratives on the three cases which shall elucidate 
similarities and differences in order to provide experiences to contemporary drug 
policy. 
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The findings demonstrate how large-scale production in China and Afghanistan was 
driven by: (1) A lack of central control over the national territory; (2) The existence of 
local power-holders (i.e. warlords and government military commanders); (3) Internal 
violent conflict; (4) The existence of a significant domestic opium consuming 
population.  
 
Whereas, the experience of Communist China suggests that a successful 
intervention requires: (1) A government which perceives suppression as in its best 
interest; (2) A government with authority throughout opium producing areas; (3) The 
provision of incentives for which farmers perceive some benefit to the cessation of 
production; (4) A state with the capability to monitor opium farmers and administer 
law enforcement. This article does not suggest the administration of a highly 
repressive intervention modelled upon the Chinese Communist Parties (henceforth 
CCP) approach, but rather the development of the structural means of suppressing 
production prior to administering any systematic law enforcement centred 
intervention. This paper shall provide detailed narratives of the three cases before 
presenting the findings of a cross-case comparison. The final section provides some 
preliminary suggestions for how the lessons learned could be transferred to 
contemporary Afghanistan.  
 
1  China: Background and Context 
During the early-1960s China removed a long standing prohibition on opium 
production in Yunnan Province to fund the suppression of the Panthay Uprising. 
Several other provinces followed this example and de facto legalisation preceded the 
official repeal of prohibition in the mid-1880s. China gradually overtook India as the 
world‟s largest source of opium and by 1905 Szechwan and South-West Hupei 
Provinces alone produced almost eight times that of India.2 Low prices and profuse 
availability increased consumption to exceptionally high levels. In 1890, an estimated 
10 percent of the Chinese population smoked opium; this may have been as high as 
60 to 80 percent in some areas,3 while as low as five percent in others.4 By 1906 
official accounts suggest that between 30 to 40 percent of the population had 
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smoked opium.5 This said, the majority appear to have consumed small quantities 
and avoided heavy or habitual use.6  
 
By the turn of the twentieth century, China began to perceive opium as a threat to the 
productivity and health of the nation7 and in September 1906 issued an Imperial 
Decree declaring the gradual suppression of opium production, trade and 
consumption.8 In 1911, however, the Imperial regime was removed and a Republic 
declared. While there was an initial resurgence during the revolutionary period, 
production remained below 1906 levels9 and in 1912 the new President ordered all 
officials to renew suppression efforts.10 Observers from the British Foreign Office 
reported how the regime initially surpassed „the rigors of the Manchu rulers‟.11 Both 
Imperial and Republican interventions were centred upon a highly repressive 
incarnation of law enforcement which pushed many farmers deeper into poverty.12 In 
1917, a Chinese-British joint investigation declared all provinces of China „opium-
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free‟.13 The fragmentation of the state was, however, to make prohibition 
unsustainable.  
 
2  China: 1917-1935 
From 1911, numerous warlords14 had begun consolidating their authority separate 
from Beijing. In 1915, several warlords from Yunnan Province declared their 
independence. Then, in response to multiple uprising in 1916, President Yuan Shikai 
abdicated. Responding to this opportunity, the majority of southern warlords declared 
independence whilst northern warlords fought over the central government in Beijing; 
essentially fragmenting the Chinese state.15 The warlords who „now controlled much 
of China, had a wide variety of backgrounds and maintained their power in different 
ways‟;16 many had been part of the national military, others were provincial or district 
governors whilst some were: 
…simply thugs…Some dominated whole provinces and financed their armies 
with local taxes collected by their own bureaucracies; others controlled only a 
handful of towns and got their money from “transit taxes” collected at gunpoint 
or through confiscation. Some warlords were deeply loyal to the idea of a 
legitimate republic…, others believed Sun Yat-sen and the Guomindang 
represented China‟s legitimate government..//.. Many… were capable of 
ferocities and erratic cruelty… but many others were educated men who tried 
to instil in their troops their own vision of morality.17 
 
The „warlord era‟ brought: 
…economic and social distress to China: opium poppies were planted in 
times of extreme famine, government administration became meaningless in 
many provinces, and the dislocation of legitimate trade impeded industrial 
growth and the modernisation of agriculture.18  
 
In short, it „brought the country to the brink of disaster‟.19 While suppression officially 
continued in areas under Beijing – just two or three provinces around the capital –   
control of the central Government was unstable and composed of belligerent 
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northern warlords.20 As such, the British consulate reported the futility of approaching 
the impotent central Government to protest against increasing production.21 
Especially as many warlords facilitated opium production to finance conflicts22 over 
territories, the central Government and areas important to the profitable opium 
trade.23  
 
British Foreign Office records suggest that dual authority often existed.24 Several 
provincial civil governments opposed opium production,25 while production was 
simultaneously facilitated by warlords. Some warlords extended advice on soil and 
irrigation management to improve yields26 and violently resisted civil eradication 
attempts.27 To ensure that opium was the only cost-effective crop, many warlords 
imposed extortionately high land taxes.28 More overt coercion included the fining or 
execution of farmers or village leaders refusing to produce opium.29 In some districts, 
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food crops were eradicated to make way for opium, contributing to famines in 
Kweichow and Shensi Provinces between 1921 and 1923, and food deficits in other 
provinces.30 This said, in other districts opium was profitable and farmers chose to 
acquiesce to warlord demands and/or openly resist civil bans.31 
 
Not all provinces grew opium. Civil authorities continued to brutally suppress 
production in Chefoo, Chungking and Shansi Provinces.32 Other civil authorities were 
apathetic or administered their own monopolies,33 often whilst publicly prohibiting 
production.34 By 1923, many civil provincial governments were recording opium taxes 
in their official treasury records and punishing unlicensed producers and merchants.  
The national military were also implicated in the distribution of opiates throughout 
China and into Burma and Indochina.35 During the early/mid-1920s national 
production averaged between 2,000 tons and 15,000 tons36 and accounted for 
anywhere between nine-tenths and 50 percent of global production. Illicitly exported 
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Chinese opium was seized in: Australia; North America; the Philippines; East and 
Southeast Asia.37  
 
By 1928, the Kuomintang („National People‟s Party‟) had partly unified China under 
their authority and removed many competing warlords through military force or 
diplomacy; ending the so-called warlord era and providing China with the last nine-
years of relative peace and order until 1949.38 The Kuomintang administered an 
opium monopoly which sold gradually decreasing quantities of opium to registered 
consumers.39 In 1928, the Kuomintang passed the Opium Suppression Act40 which 
criminalised all unregulated production and sale. Provincial and district officials were 
ordered to eradicate crops and punish re-cultivation. The Act was followed by a 
series of regulations which together allowed for the punishment of ineffective state 
officials and obliged magistrates to comply with the 1928 Act.41  
 
Nonetheless, unregulated production and sale continued, including the implication of 
the civil military in morphine manufacturing and illicit opiate trafficking.42 This said, 
strict prohibitions were enforced in areas where the Kuomintang were conducting 
anti-communist campaigns: ineffective magistrates were punished and farmers were 
executed.43 
 
                                                 
37
 See, Bulletin of Narcotics, „Illicit Traffic in Opium‟; Welles A. Gray, „The Opium Problem,‟ 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 122 (1925) 148-159. 
38
 Peace and order must be perceived in relative terms as the Kuomintang failed to protect 
the peasantry from the violence and exploitation of military forces: Bianco, origins of the 
Chinese Revolution, 1915-1949. 
39
 Baumler, „Opium Control Versus Opium Suppression: The Origin of the 1935 Six-Year Plan 
to Eliminate Opium and Drugs‟; B. Dai, „A Brief Sketch of the Opium Condition in China 
During the Year 1926-1927,‟ in National Anti-Opium Association of China (ed.) Opium: A 
World Problem, 1(4) (National Anti-Opium Association of China, 1928). 
40
 „1928 Opium Suppression Act,‟ in National Anti-Opium Association of China (ed.) Opium: A 
World Problem, 2(1) (National Anti-Opium Association of China, 1928). 
41
 Chinese Government Opium Suppression Committee, (1929), Traffic in Opium and Other 
Dangerous Drugs: Annual Report, 1929. TNA FO371/15524. 
42
 See, FO, (1930), „British-Consulate General, Chungking. Morphia: Reports on Prohibition of 
Manufacture‟. TNA FO228/4292. 1930/75; H.H. Harding, (1932), „British Consulate, Foochow, 
20
th
 September, 1932‟. TNA FO371/16251; A.J. Martin, (1932), „Mr. A.J. Martin to Sir Miles W. 
Lampoon. (British Consulate, Foochow) 18
th
 January, 1932‟. TNA CO825/139; Mills, (1924), 
„Acting Consul Mills to Sir R. Macleay. November 7
th
 1923‟. TNA FO371/10337. Political: Far 
East Opium; Henry G.W. Woodhead, „Current Comment on Events in China: The Truth About 
Opium in China,‟ Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury (1930); Slack, „The National Anti-
Opium Association and the Guomindang State, 1924-1937‟. 
43
 Zhou Yongming, Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth-Century China: Nationalism, History, and 
State Building (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999). 
Law, Crime and History (2011) 2 
 
148 
 
Throughout the 1920s, opium continued to be produced in warlord controlled areas; 
perpetuating conflicts between warlord factions and the central Government.44 The 
Kuomintang delegate to the Hague Opium Conference described suppression as a 
„farce‟ and declared that 12,090 tons were produced annually.45 Henry Woodhead, 
who considered the Kuomintang figure too conservative, dispatched a questionnaire 
to knowledgeable individuals on the opium situation. The findings suggested the 
continual compulsion of farmers by military and civil authorities to produce opium. 
Furthermore, national production had increased under Kuomintang protection with 
just three provinces actively enforcing prohibition.46 
 
In short, by the end of the 1920s production continued unabated, interdiction was 
unenforced and the Kuomintang were either helpless47 or facilitating production and 
distribution. In 1930, the League of Nations singled China out as the primary source 
of illicit opium in East and Southeast Asia, whilst Louise Eisenlohr described China 
as „the most serious menace to any scheme of universal control, either of drug 
manufacture or of opium cultivation‟.48 Zhou Yongming reports how 1930 represented 
the peak of Chinese production:49 production ranged anywhere between 12,195 
tonnes50 and 60,000 tonnes.51 While Kuomintang measures to reduce production 
after 1935 shall be discussed briefly below, the following section shall introduce 
history‟s second largest opium producer: Afghanistan. 
 
3  Afghanistan: 1950-2001 
Afghanistan, which only became a major global source of opium during the mid-
1950s,52 first prohibited opium in 1969. The ban was, however, under resourced and 
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seldom imposed,53 especially during the periods of violent conflict after the 1978 
coup d’état. The combined conflicts of the 1980s and 1990s devastated 
Afghanistan‟s agricultural resources and rural infrastructure, leaving opium as one of 
the few available cash crops.54 A situation magnified by many Mujahedeen warlords 
facilitating opiate production, manufacturing and distribution.55 Production steeply 
increased throughout this period (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure . Afghanistan: Opium production (1970-2007) 
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Source: adapted from, Holahan, J.F. and Henningsen, P.A. (1972). „The Economics 
of Heroin‟.In Drug Abuse Survey Project. (Eds.). Dealing with Drug Abuse. 
Washington: Praeger Publishers; NNICC. (1978-1993). The Supply of Drugs to the 
US Illicit Market. Washington: US Government Printing Office; INCSR. (1995-2010). 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. Washington: US State Department; 
UNODC. (2002-2010). World Drug Report. Vienna: UNODC.  
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The 1992 overthrow of the Communist Government launched a period of „warlord 
rule‟56 whereby multiple warlords and criminal organisations fought for control of 
territory and the profits from illicit trades.57 Consequently, by 1994 Afghanistan had 
overtaken Burma as the world‟s largest source of illicit opium. A modicum of stability 
was eventually established by the Taliban. While the Taliban initially enforced a strict 
ban on opium, by 1996 - aware of the resentment many felt at losing opium revenue - 
prohibition was repealed and the Taliban began protecting and taxing the trade.58 De 
facto legalisation increased the number of provinces producing opium from ten to 
23.59 
 
In 2001, under international pressure, the Taliban once again banned opium 
production. Administering an intervention centred upon a highly repressive 
incarnation of law enforcement,60 the area under cultivation fell by 91 percent.61 The 
ban drove many landowners and farmers further into debt, facilitated widespread 
popular resistance and weakened the Taliban‟s authority just prior to the American 
led invasion.62 During the conflict, rural infrastructures were further damaged63 and 
the state disintegrated into warring and rent seeking factions. Production increased 
on a steep incline from then onwards (see Figure 1). 
 
4  Afghanistan: 2001-2011 
In 2009, it was estimated that 1.9 percent of the Afghan population had consumed 
opium.64 While not as high as Imperial China, Afghanistan remains one of the world‟s 
largest opium consuming populations.  In terms of supply, for many of the Afghan 
political elite the opium trade is rewarding. Many warlords appointed to legitimate 
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political/bureaucratic positions after 2001 had previously exerted authority over 
aspects of the opiate trade.65 While formal ties with overt, criminal activity were 
rejected in order to enter legitimate state institutions, several former warlords 
exploited their position by protecting „former‟ contacts.66  
 
A less iniquitous obstruction to the state (or political elite) from perceiving opium 
suppression as in their best interest may be the perception that a sharp decline in 
production would be economically and politically damaging. Afghanistan is one of the 
least developed countries in the world. The Government of Afghanistan have 
reported that 12 million individuals survive below the poverty line, while the UN has 
ranked it the fourth poorest country in the world in terms of food security.67 In 2009, 
opium was produced by 12.9 percent of the rural population,68 whilst a quarter of all 
economic activity was centred upon opium.69 Analogous to the 2001 Taliban opium 
ban, there is a concern that suppression would strengthen the insurgency and 
alienate rural populations.70 Hence, while the opium trade represents a barrier to 
long-term economic growth and foreign investment,71 support for a policy which could 
remove the income of a third of the population, destabilise the economy and ignite 
anti-government feelings is understandably low. 
 
Afghanistan has „historically been characterised by a weak state in dynamic relations 
with a strong society‟, resulting in a series of complex relationships between the state 
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and multiple „micro-societies‟ based upon cultural, tribal or linguistic lines.72 While 
Kabul presently exerts fragile control over some of the national territory, parallel 
centres of authority exist throughout much of Afghanistan. Some southern and 
eastern areas are governed entirely by the Taliban, while in other areas governance 
is limited by an insurgency which has annually increased in intensity since 2002.73 
 
Even in areas with a significant state presence, the Government „has neither the 
capacity nor the legitimacy to mobilise capital or coercion‟.74 Most state institutions 
are corrupt, lacking in adequate resources and trained personnel, and generally 
ineffective.75 Since 2005, the weaknesses of the Government, and high civilian 
casualties from the insurgency, have diminished popular support for Kabul and 
increased support for insurgent groups.76 
 
The weakness in governance and lack of state authority is most conspicuous in the 
criminal justice system: the vast majority of Afghans choose to use informal dispute 
resolution mechanisms, or even the Taliban, rather than the formal criminal justice 
system,77 which is under-resourced, undertrained and inefficient. Evocative of the 
entire system, the police are corrupt, abusive and criminalised.78  
 
Representative of state weakness is that since 2006, drug control has been centred 
upon the „Good Performance Indicators‟ scheme and „Governor-led Eradication‟ 
which motivate provincial and district governors to ban and eradicate opium poppies. 
Under the scheme, governors are rewarded with funding for development projects if 
their provinces can present significant reductions.79  
 
                                                 
72
 Amin Saikal, „Afghanistan: Elite Fragmentation,‟ in Wolfgang Danspeckgruber (ed.) 
Petersberg Papers on Afghanistan and the Region (Liechtenstein Institute on Self-
Determination, 2009) p.65. 
73
 Fair and Jones, Securing Afghanistan; Talatbek Masadykov, Antonio Giustozzi and James 
Page, Negotiating with the Taliban: Towards a Solution for the Afghan Conflict, (London 
School of Economics, 2010); Paoli et al., The World Heroin Market: Can Supply be Cut? 
74
 Goodhand, „Corrupting or Consolidating the Peace? The Drugs Economy and Post-conflict 
Peacebuilding in Afghanistan,‟ p.415. 
75
 Saikal, „Afghanistan: Elite Fragmentation‟; James Windle and Graham Farrell,  
„Afghanistan,‟, in Graeme Newman and Doris Chung (eds.) Crime and Punishment Around 
the World (Greenwood Publishers, 2010). 
76
 Masadykov et al., Negotiating with the Taliban: Towards a Solution for the Afghan Conflict. 
77
 Ali Wardak, „The Rule of Law in Afghanistan: An Overview‟, in Wolfgang Danspeckgruber 
(ed.) Petersberg Papers on Afghanistan and the Region (Liechtenstein Institute on Self-
Determination, 2009). 
78
 Windle and Farrell, „Afghanistan‟. 
79
 Christopher Blanchard, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy (Congressional Research 
Service, RL32686, 2009). 
Law, Crime and History (2011) 2 
 
153 
 
More often than not, governors must negotiate with local power-holders (i.e., 
warlords, strongmen or tribal leaders) to eradicate crops in their sphere of influence.80 
Governor and local power-holder administered suppression has tended to centre 
upon law enforcement - including forced eradication and the threat of military attack - 
rather than the development of alternative incomes. The lack of developmental aid 
has pushed many (ex-)opium farmers deeper into poverty and debt.81 While the 
relationship between Kabul and governors, and between governors and local power-
holders, is often unstable and reliant on negotiations. Many have sought the 
maintenance of insecurity for personal gain while there are reports that opium bans 
have been administered to control prices. Others have siphoned compensation 
intended for the farmer or funding for village development into their own pockets or 
inequitably distributed resources from those which need them the most.82  
 
Having discussed history‟s two largest producers of opium the last case study will 
introduce a successful national intervention. Before introducing the intervention 
undertaken by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the intervening period between 
the Warlord and Communist era‟s (1935-49) shall be summarised to provide some 
context.  
 
5  The People’s Republic of China: 1935-49 
By 1935, large portions of China were under Kuomintang authority and most western 
warlords had been integrated into the state, allowing the Kuomintang to administer 
the „Six-Year Plan‟. Under the „Enforcement Measures for the Suppression of 
Dangerous Drugs‟,83 the Plan provided for the gradual suppression of distribution and 
consumption by 1940: production was prohibition in all but eight provinces.84 Under a 
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state monopoly, farmers were licensed to produce gradually diminishing quantities for 
sale through the state monopoly to registered consumers and opium merchants were 
taxed by the state whilst transiting the Yangtze River to the markets of Shanghai and 
Hubei.85 Punishments for unauthorised production or trade were reported as 
„barbarous‟:86 at least 263 individuals were executed in 193587 and unregulated crops 
were forcefully eradicated. Crop substitution was administered and by 1939, wheat 
was reported to be more profitable than opium in Hupeh and Kansu Provinces.88  
 
Several foreign observers were initially dubious of the national and provincial 
commitment. Some stronger warlords overtly resisted Kuomintang authority or 
clandestinely administered their own monopolies, while significant quantities of opium 
were diverted from the official monopoly.89 During the first year of the Plan, the 
League of Nations declared China the principal global source of both raw opium and 
manufactured opiates.90 Nonetheless, in 1937 President Chiang Kai-shek reported 
that the „cultivation of the opium poppy in the various provinces in the interior has 
long since been completely suppressed‟ and was limited to a small number of 
districts in the „frontier provinces‟.91 The statement was collaborated at the League of 
Nations by America and France, while the Foreign Policy Association reported that 
„the rising price of opium… had forced many to give up smoking‟.92 Success, 
however, was limited by conflict. In 1937, Japan invaded and occupied the majority of 
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central Chinese provinces: fracturing the nine years of relative peace and stability.93 
The Japanese military monopolised, and facilitated, opium production and 
distribution, which had practically ceased under the Plan.94  
 
In 1939, the Kuomintang reported to the League of Nations that after one last purge - 
in which 159,449 hectares of poppies were eradicated, four farmers were executed 
and 25 imprisoned - almost all production had ceased in areas under their authority. 
Britain and Siam, however, complained that Yunnanese opium continued to be 
smuggled into Siam.95 This said, in a statement confirmed by the British Foreign 
Office, the Kuomintang Interior Minister declared that production was limited to 
Yunnanese border areas.96 The Province was declared „opium-free‟ by the British 
Consulate in 1940. Conversely, the Consulate to Sichuan Province reported how 
opium was smuggled into the province from Sikang, Kweichow and Yunnan. Both 
consulates, however, reported that scarcity had inflated retail-prices.97 
 
By 1937, production had declined to an estimated 890 tonnes.98 In 1941, when 
absolute prohibition was enacted, production was limited to Japanese occupied 
territories and the remote frontier areas99 of Yunnan, Kweichow and Sikang, where 
violent opposition to eradication was common.  
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While American and British intelligence suggests that Chinese production remained 
low throughout the early-1940s,100 diminishing Kuomintang authority during the Sino-
Japanese War (1937-45) and Civil War (1945-49) resulted in a resurgence in 
production as, once again, all warring factions profited from the production and trade 
in opium, in some cases compelling farmers.101 In 1944, the League of Nations 
reported that China produced 65.4 percent of the world‟s illicit opium. In 1947, the 
League‟s Permanent Central Opium Board stated „China may still be well at the head 
of the list of opium-producing countries‟.102  
 
6  People’s Republic of China: 1949+ 
In 1949, the CCP expelled the Kuomintang from office and by 1952 had largely 
unified the country under their authority, renaming the country the People‟s Republic 
of China. In 1950, the CCP promulgated the Decree Regarding Suppression of 
Opium and Narcotics which obliged: forced eradication in areas which had come 
under state authority; gradual reductions in areas inhabited by minority groups „in the 
light of the actual local circumstances‟; complete prohibition on the distribution of 
opium (and other narcotics) and that all offenders be „severely punished‟.103 It is 
widely acknowledged that production had ceased by 1953 in areas under state 
authority: minority areas lagged until the late-1950s after which production was 
minimal, sporadic and limited to remote areas of Yunnan.104  
 
The intervention can be split into three interlinking constituent parts: incentives, 
disincentives and social control. Together these increased the risk and decreased the 
rewards for producing opium. Furthermore, a number of factors converged to reduce 
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demand. The introduction of penicillin reduced the need for opium as medicine while 
recreationally it was increasingly perceived as old-fashioned, especially by the urban 
youth.105 Even as early as the 1940s British Foreign Office observers remarked that 
opium smoking had become unfashionable and „shameful‟.106 Additionally, social 
control and repressive prohibition had inflated the risk for those who wished to 
consume opium.107  
 
Incentives 
In „minority areas‟108 crop substitution, land redistribution and, infrastructural and 
social welfare projects were administered prior to law enforcement to enable both 
state extension and drug control.109 A Chinese participant at a UN conference 
recounted how the CCP distributed improved seeds and modern technology to 
farmers throughout China to encourage them to grow grains and cash crops instead 
of opium.110 Several foreign observers described how food crops had replaced 
opium.111 In terms of cash crops, throughout the 1950s the CCP encouraged the 
production of tobacco and manufacturing of cigarettes: annual cigarette production 
increased from 80 billion in 1949 to 238 billion in 1958.112  
 
Precise information on crop substitution is, however, limited and CCP accounts and 
foreign observations appear somewhat inconsistent with Chinese agricultural 
planning. Between 1952 and 1957, agricultural productivity grew on average by 4.6 
percent per year113 and by 1956/57 food access had improved:114 although remaining 
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below international definitions of subsistence.115 Much of the success was 
attributable to private production, which was banned in 1958. Central control of 
agriculture, which was mismanaged by bureaucrats with little experience of 
agriculture,116 resulted in a famine which killed an estimated 18.48 to 30 million rural 
people between 1959 and 1961.117  
 
In 1958, the CCP implemented the „Great Leap Forward‟ to modernise the state. As 
the development of heavy industry was an integral component of the plan, the 
majority of farmers were ordered away from agriculture to support iron production.118 
Those remaining on agricultural duties were ordered to offset the diversion of 
resources by increasing the planting density of crops, as this was erroneously 
believed to increase yields. Furthermore, there was insufficient labour to collect even 
negligible harvests. The policy failed to produce large-amounts of iron whilst 
decreasing food availability.119  
 
Agricultural planning and management was ineffective during the period when the 
development of opium farming areas would have been administered. Thus, if 
developmental assistance was administered as an incentive for the cessation of 
opium production, the experience of the Great Leap Forward would suggest the 
inability of the CCP to provide effective alternative livelihoods, at least in some areas. 
The CCP did, however, provide opium farmers with alternative incentives.  
 
A factor in CCP success during the three-year Civil War was that the Kuomintang 
had become increasingly unpopular with a rural population which had been 
„constantly subjected to forced labour and arbitrary taxation, constantly brutalised 
and plundered‟ by soldiers and bandits. Massive inflation and the imposition of 
unequal taxation on agricultural crops had pushed many rural people‟s further into 
poverty, meaning that „poverty, abuse, and early death were the only prospects for 
                                                 
115
 Fairbank, China: A New History. 
116
 Spence, The Search for Modern China.; Yao, „A Note on the Causal Factors of China's 
Famine in 1959-1961‟. Justin Lin, however, rejects this as a cause but concedes that it did 
add to the severity of the famine: Justin Lin, „Collectivization and China's Agricultural Crisis in 
1959-1961,‟ The Journal of Political Economy, 98(6) (1990) 1228-1252. 
117
 Yao, „A Note on the Causal Factors of China's Famine in 1959-1961‟; Justin Lin and 
Dennis Yang, „Food Availability, Entitlements and the Chinese Famine of 1959-61,‟ The 
Economic Journal, 110(460) (2000) 136-158. 
118
 Vaclav Smil, „China's Great Famine: 40 Years Later,‟ British Medical Journal, 319 (1999) 
1619-1621. 
119
 Fairbank, China: A New History; Smil, „China's Great Famine: 40 Years Later‟; Spence, 
The Search for Modern China; Yao, „A Note on the Causal Factors of China's Famine in 
1959-1961‟. 
Law, Crime and History (2011) 2 
 
159 
 
nearly half a billion people‟. Additionally, there was an awareness of the pervasive 
corruption of the Kuomintang, whilst war had highlighted the inability of the 
Kuomintang‟s administrative capabilities. Many were quite simply tired of decades of 
constant violent conflict, abuse and insecurity.120  
 
The CCP, on the other hand, received significant rural support. The policies of land 
redistribution and landlord punishment were especially popular: in central-south 
China, an estimated 60 percent of the population benefitted from land reforms.121 As 
John Fairbank notes:  
Here was a conquering army of country boys who were strictly self-
disciplined, polite, and helpful, at the opposite pole from the looting and 
raping warlord and troops and even departing… [Kuomintang]. Here was a 
dedicated government that really cleaned things up – not only the drains and 
streets but also the beggars, prostitutes and petty criminals… Here was a 
new China one could be proud of, one that controlled inflation, abolished 
foreign privileges, stamped out opium smoking and corruption generally, and 
brought the citizenry into a multitude of sociable activities to repair public 
works, spread literacy, control disease,…//… Only later did they see that the 
Promised Land was based on systematic control and manipulation.122 
 
Therefore, the initial redistribution of land, removal of warlord and landlord 
exploitation, freeing of slaves, ideological affiliation, improved security and general 
promises of improved livelihoods under socialism may have motivated many to 
acquiesce to the cessation of opium production. This said, by the early-1960s, 
agricultural mismanagement - at considerable cost to human life - might have diluted 
revolutionary zeal. By this point, however, China had developed a highly repressive, 
intrusive and hegemonic state machine. 
 
Disincentives 
In late-1951/early-1952, the Three and Five Antis Campaigns identified - through 
investigates into official corruption - a number of large-scale traffickers. Following a 
nationwide intelligence gathering campaign, from August 1952 there were four 
nationwide waves of arrests, followed by extensive propaganda campaigns. The 
arrests ceased in October 1952 to allow the judiciary to catch-up: 82,056 of 369,705 
individuals initially targeted had been arrested (34,775 were imprisoned or executed; 
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2,138 were imprisoned in labour camps; 6,843 were placed under surveillance and 
4,337 were „uncategorised‟).123 Opium poppies were forcefully eradicated.124 
 
Offenders were tried and punished during mass rallies in which 800125 to 880 
individuals were publically executed. Before the campaign the CCP had specified 
what percentage of those prosecuted were to be executed: enough to remove high-
level traffickers, especially those deemed counter-revolutionaries, and inflate 
perceived risk to deter lower-level offenders from future transgression.126 Annette 
Rubinstein witnessed:  
… a policy of highly selective, strictly enforced, drastic punitive measures for 
major offenders on the one hand, and on the other hand amnesty and 
government support for victims and cooperative petty offender.127  
 
Carol Jones reports that the mid-1950s/mid-1960s were perceived by many as a 
„golden age‟ of safety and order.128 During this period punishments included 
execution, forced labour and administrative sanctions, such as forced resettlement or 
limited access to social goods.129 While capital punishment was imposed by courts, 
some forced labour and administrative sanctions could be imposed by civil 
associations and a police force which possessed „virtually unlimited power in 
investigation, detaining, prosecuting and convicting criminal suspects‟ and commonly 
punished extra-judicially.130 Therefore, while the state may have executed „just‟ 800 
to 880 individuals, extra-judicial deaths or other physical punishments may have 
been higher. Punishments for production may have also been categorised as crimes 
against the communal production of food crops, counterrevolutionary crimes or linked 
to the more repressive aspects of minority „liberation‟.  
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The severity of law enforcement dovetailed the level of authority possessed by the 
CCP in specific area. In areas under CCP authority, bans on production were 
enforced quickly and centred upon public humiliation and executions, near constant 
surveillance and „administrative punishments‟. Whereas in minority areas the state 
sequenced opium bans after administering policies of state extension and agricultural 
reform. This is illustrated with an example of the Liangshan Yi Autonomous 
Prefecture (Sichuan Province) where 50 to 80 percent of households produced 
opium. In the Han Chinese areas, suppression was conducted in synergy with the 
national campaign: opium was forcefully eradicated, 26 individuals were executed 
and over 300 were imprisoned. In ethnic Yi areas, the CCP initially projected 
propaganda and appealed to local leaders to cease selling to the Han Chinese 
population. Then, in mid-1954, the CCP began interdicting opium in Han areas and 
extending substitute crops in Yi areas. By 1955, Yi farmers voluntarily uprooted 1,072 
hectares in exchange for substitute crops. An attempt by the CCP at forced 
eradication was, however, violently resisted. Then in 1956, the CCP administered 
„democratic reforms‟ in Yi areas. As these included land distribution and the freeing 
of slaves they were popular with the Yi peasantry, who joined the CCP military in 
suppressing opposition to reform.  By late-1957 all ethnic Yi areas were under CCP 
authority and prohibition was immediately enforced. As farmers did not want to 
jeopardise their newly acquired land or freedom and the primary facilitators of opium 
production (the landlords) had been removed, production decreased as 
acquiescence to prohibition increased. Then, in 1958/59, all opium was forcefully 
eradicated and 3,000 were arrested as drug offenders or counter-revolutionaries.131 
 
Social control 
Communism made people dependent on the state. In urban areas, necessities were 
rationed and housing, health care and education distributed through places of work. 
In rural areas land redistribution and collectivisation tied farmers to communal 
land.132 There was minimal freedom of travel or choice of employment.133 In short, 
China was a „police state‟ with „unquestioned control over the populace in villages‟.134  
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Civil institutions – such as resident‟s or women‟s groups - were established in cities 
and rural villages and, alongside official coercive state institutions, „contributed to the 
formation of a social control network that could encompass every aspect of an 
individual‟s life‟ and was strong enough to „break connections even between family 
members‟.135 Furthermore, fear of being a target for CCP criticism produced high 
levels of compliance whilst providing the state „a gaze far more “panoptical” than 
anything designed by Bentham‟.136 
 
7  Cross-case comparison 
This section shall summarise the three case study findings to elucidate some 
similarities and differences. The primary findings are illustrated in Table 1. China 
(1917-35) and Afghanistan (2000-11) are two of history‟s largest opium producing 
nations. In both cases, the central government possessed limited authority over the 
majority of the national territory, much of which was controlled by local power-
holders; many of whom were competing with other power-holders and the state for 
authority. Furthermore, many of the political elite failed to perceive the suppression of 
production as in their best interest for reasons of national interest and/or personal 
greed. Both cases were characterised by widespread domestic consumption. Where 
China and Afghanistan differ is that in China there was no real national attempt at 
suppressing production (until 1935); while in Afghanistan suppression interventions 
are officially a national priority.  
 
The introduction of the People‟s Republic of China into the analytical mix provides a 
case of a government capable of opium suppression, compared against two cases of 
incapable national governments. The People‟s Republic of China is almost the 
reverse of the Afghan and earlier Chinese experiences. The centre possessed 
almost complete authority over its national territory, whilst violent conflict was 
minimal. The majority of the political elite perceived suppression as in their best 
interest from ideological and practical perspectives. There is little evidence of the 
state or its employees facilitating the trade, partly because of controls over corruption 
and the perceived benefits of suppression. The perception of opium as an old 
fashioned drug coupled with the efficient (yet unsavoury) suppression of opium 
consumption reduced the domestic demand for opium. In turn, reducing the farmgate 
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price and lessening opposition to suppression. Furthermore, the CCP provided 
farmers with incentives to acquiesce to suppression; based upon loyalty to the 
Revolution, these included: land reform, the freeing of slaves and ideological 
affiliation. Revolutionary zeal also afforded the state the opportunity to create a highly 
intrusive surveillance network. 
 
Unlike in Afghanistan, the CCP provided farmers with initial incentives to acquiesce 
to suppression. Only then - once the state had consolidated its authority and farmers 
perceived some benefit in suppression - were the highly effective (and repressive) 
law enforcement campaigns (supported by intrusive surveillance) administered.  
 
 
Table  Similarities and differences 
China (1917-1935) Afghanistan (2000-
2011) 
 
Peoples Republic of China 
Centre possesses limited 
authority 
Centre possesses limited 
authority 
Centre possesses almost 
complete authority 
Local power-holders 
uncontrolled by centre 
Local power-holders 
uncontrolled by centre 
Local power-holders 
controlled by centre 
Large-scale internal 
conflicts (multiple 
belligerents) 
Large-scale internal 
conflicts (multiple 
belligerents) 
Minimal internal conflict 
Control of opium is not 
perceived as in political 
elites best interest 
Control of opium is not 
perceived as in political 
elites best interest 
Control of opium is 
perceived as in political 
elites best interest 
State officials facilitate 
trade 
State officials facilitate 
trade 
Minimal facilitation by 
state officials 
Significant domestic opium 
consumption 
Significant domestic opium 
consumption 
Minimal domestic opium 
consumption 
Minimal surveillance Insufficient surveillance Extensive and intrusive 
surveillance 
No intervention Intervention provides 
minimal incentive to 
ceasing production 
Intervention provides 
extensive incentives to 
ceasing production 
No intervention Ineffective intervention Effective intervention 
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This review of Afghanistan is not meant to be exhaustive but rather to illustrate a 
practical application of the comparative findings. The comparisons of the three cases 
suggests that suppression of illicit production requires four medium-term objectives: 
(1) The extension of the state into isolated and hostile areas; (2) The facilitation of a 
sense of self-interest in the Afghan Government and political elite towards opium 
suppression; (3) The facilitation of a perception that suppression benefits opium 
farmers; (4) The strengthening of the Afghan Government‟s capacity to monitor 
opium farmers and enforce national law. 
 
All strategies must facilitate these primary objectives; any that negate them must be 
discontinued. Analogously to the People‟s Republic of China, the Afghan intervention 
must be designed as opium suppression mainstreamed into state extension. In the 
Afghan context, rural development137 and conflict resolution/limitation may represent 
effective means of supporting state extension, whilst providing incentives for farmers 
to accept opium bans. The establishment of a safer Afghanistan may represent the 
definitive incentive for the cessation of opium production. As one fieldworker reported 
the peoples „of Helmand would trade almost anything for [security and peace, and]… 
would follow anyone who could offer it‟.138  
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